Mentre i giornali italiani continuano a celebrare i fasti del viaggio del premier in USA e la recente compressione degli spread italiani, la realtà ostinatamente continua a presentarsi alla nostra porta.
S&P ha appena declassato il rating di 34 delle 37 istituzioni finanziarie italiane che segue, motivando la decisione con il continuo deterioramento delle prospettive diredditività e di rischio delle banche, fortemente condizionate dalle "zavorre" della situazione macroeconomica del Paese.
La società ha anche collocato l'industria bancaria del Paese all'interno di un sistema di classificazione, con punteggio da 1 a 10, in funzione dell'esposizione al rischio. L'Italia adesso figura nella classe 4, insieme ai sistemi bancari di Repubblica Ceca, Sud Africa, Messico e Brasile. Ogni commento, in linea con le nostre ben note perplessità sul sistema bancario nostrano, è abbondantemente superfluo...
In basso alleghiamo l'interessantissima "motivazione" di questa sentenza, con in grassetto i passaggi che mi sembrano più evocativi. I più istruttivi sono senz'altro i seguenti:
"Italy has a large and diversified economy with a sizable domestic
market and manufacturing export sector. However, we anticipate weaker
GDP growth for Italy relative to its peers owing to Italy's high public
sector debt, which in our view is discouraging investment; weakening
Italy's export competitiveness; and to Italy's worsening demographic
profile."
"While these profitability ratios would be
only slightly below the average for 2009-2010, they would represent
less than half of returns in 2005-2008. Persistently weak profitability
for the next few years, together with increased cost of capital for
the whole banking industry, could lead Italian banks to write down a
large part of the goodwill they booked during the consolidation phase
of the past decade. We note, though, that Italian banks' risk appetite
generally remains restrained, reflecting their traditional business
model."
LONDON (Standard & Poor's) Feb. 10, 2012--Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services today said it has lowered its ratings on 34
Italy-based financial institutions. The downgrades follow the lowering
of the unsolicited long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings on
the Republic of Italy (BBB+/Negative/A-2; see "
Italy's Unsolicited Ratings Lowered To 'BBB+/A-2'; Outlook Negative,"
published Jan. 13, 2012, on RatingsDirect on the Global Credit
Portal). They also reflect the revision of our Banking Industry Country
Risk Assessment (BICRA) on Italy to group '4' from group '3', and of
our economic risk and industry risk scores--both components of the
BICRA--on Italy to '4' from '3' (see
"BICRA On Italy Revised To Group '4' From Group '3' On Weakening Economic And Banking Industry Conditions," published Feb. 10, 2012).
In addition, we have affirmed our ratings on two Italian financial
institutions and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications. We have also kept the ratings on one Italian financial
institution on CreditWatch with negative implications.
Mainly Negative Rating Actions Taken On 37 Italian Financial Institutions On Sovereign Downgrade And BICRA Change
OVERVIEW
- On Jan. 13, 2012, Standard & Poor's lowered its unsolicited
long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of Italy
to 'BBB+/A-2' from 'A/A-1', assigned a negative outlook, and removed
the ratings from CreditWatch negative.
- In our view, Italy's vulnerability to external financing risks has
increased, given its high external public debt, resulting in Italian
banks' significantly diminished ability to roll over their wholesale
debt.
- We anticipate persistently weak profitability for Italian banks in
the next few years, and a risk-adjusted return on core banking products
that may not be sufficient for banks to meet their cost of capital. We
believe this may be negative for the Italian banking industry's
stability.
- We are revising our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment
(BICRA) on the Republic of Italy to group '4' from group '3', and our
economic risk and industry risk scores, two components of the BICRA, to
'4' from '3'.
- Our revised BICRA and economic risk score for Italy have resulted
in primarily negative rating actions for the Italian banks we rate.
BICRA ACTION
On Feb. 10, 2012, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its
Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) on the Republic of
Italy (unsolicited ratings, BBB+/Negative/A-2) to group '4' from group
'3'. It has also revised the economic risk and industry risk scores,
two components of the BICRA, to '4' from '3'. These revisions follow our
recent downgrade of the Republic of Italy (see "Italy's Unsolicited
Ratings Lowered To 'BBB+/A-2'; Outlook Negative ," published Jan. 13,
2012, on RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal).
RATIONALE
The BICRA change reflects our view that Italy's vulnerability to
external financing risks has increased, given its high absolute amount
of external public debt. This results in adverse spill-over effects on
Italian banks, in particular significantly diminishing their ability to
roll over their wholesale debt. In addition, we anticipate
persistently weak profitability for Italian banks in the next few
years, and a risk-adjusted return on core banking products that may not
be sufficient for banks to meet their cost of capital. We believe this
may be negative for the Italian banking industry's stability.
Standard & Poor's BICRA rankings integrate its view of the
strengths and weaknesses of a country's banking system compared with
those of other countries. A BICRA is scored on a scale from 1 to 10,
ranging from the lowest-risk banking systems (group '1') to the
highest-risk (group '10'). Countries in BICRA group '4' include Czech
Republic, South Africa, Mexico and Brazil.
Our revised BICRA and economic risk score for Italy have resulted in
primarily negative rating actions on the Italian banks we rate (see
"Mainly Negative Rating Actions Taken On 37 Italian Financial
Institutions On Sovereign Downgrade And BICRA Change," published Feb.
10, 2012).
The economic risk score of '4' is based on our revised opinion of
Italy's "economic imbalances," one of the score's main components, to
"intermediate risk" from "low risk," as our criteria define these terms.
The economic risk score is an input in our calculation of
risk-weighted assets (RWA) for banks under our risk-adjusted capital
(RAC) framework (see "Bank Capital Methodology And Assumptions,"
published Dec. 6, 2010). Our revised economic risk score will likely
lead to moderate declines in our RAC ratios for banks operating in
Italy.
We believe that Italy's higher vulnerability to external financing
may represent a risk to the sustainability of Italy's balance of
payments. The deepening political, financial, and monetary problems in
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU or the eurozone) are exacerbating
the external funding constraints on the Italian public and private
sectors, in our opinion. Italy's external financing costs have risen
markedly in recent months and may remain elevated for an extended
period as the Italian government and banks scale back cross-border
financing. Still, we acknowledge that imbalances in asset prices and
the buildup of leverage are low in Italy. In our view, these factors
remain key supports for Italian banks' creditworthiness.
Our assessment of "intermediate risk" for "economic resilience" and
"credit risk in the economy," the two remaining components of the
economic risk score, remains unchanged.
Italy has a large and diversified economy with a sizable domestic
market and manufacturing export sector. However, we anticipate weaker
GDP growth for Italy relative to its peers owing to Italy's high public
sector debt, which in our view is discouraging investment; weakening
Italy's export competitiveness; and to Italy's worsening demographic
profile.
The Italian private sector carries, in our view, moderate debt at
128% of GDP expected at year-end 2011. Household indebtedness, at 45%
of GDP, is low relative to levels in peer countries. In addition,
Italian households' financial wealth is about two times GDP, which
sustains their creditworthiness in case of difficulties. Italy's
banking sector typically has high levels of nonperforming assets (NPAs)
relative to countries that we assess as having similar economic risk.
The high NPAs reflect Italian banks' large share of loans to small and
midsize enterprises, which form the backbone of the Italian economy.
Extensive use of collateral has, however, generally enabled banks to
post only moderate credit losses.
The industry risk score of '4' is based on our revised opinion of
the Italian banking sector's "competitive dynamics" and "systemwide
funding" to "intermediate risk" from "low risk," as our criteria define
these terms.
Our view that Italian banks' profitability will likely remain weak
in the next few years reflects Italy's flat economic growth, and banks'
increased cost of funding and still high credit provisions.
Risk-adjusted returns on core banking products may not be sufficient
for banks to meet their cost of capital. We believe this may be
negative for the Italian banking sector's stability. Based on our
estimates, the return on adjusted assets related to domestic banking
business should average close to 30 basis points in 2011-2013. The net
income-to-revenue ratio should bottom out in 2012 and remain below 10%
in the same period.
While these profitability ratios would be
only slightly below the average for 2009-2010, they would represent
less than half of returns in 2005-2008. Persistently weak profitability
for the next few years, together with increased cost of capital for
the whole banking industry, could lead Italian banks to write down a
large part of the goodwill they booked during the consolidation phase
of the past decade. We note, though, that Italian banks' risk appetite
generally remains restrained, reflecting their traditional business
model.
We believe that "systemwide funding" risk for Italian banks has
increased, mainly owing to the effects of the sovereign debt crisis in
Europe. European Central Bank (ECB; AAA/Stable/A-1+) funding provided
to Italian banks was up sharply at €203 billion at end-January 2012, or
6% of total funding, versus €41 billion at end-June 2011. In our view,
the steep rise is due to Italian banks having largely lost their
access to external wholesale debt capital markets, which we believe
will in turn significantly reduce their ability to roll over their
wholesale debt this year. In our opinion, Italian banks' recourse to
the ECB may further increase after the ECB's next Long-Term Refinancing
Operation (LTRO) scheduled in late February 2012 (for further details
on ECB funding to eurozone banks, see "Assessing The Severity Of The
Eurozone Recession Is A Close Call," published Jan. 31, 2012). We
believe that the ECB's proactive stance on providing liquidity to
Italian banks has avoided a domestic credit crunch.
Italian banks' recourse to wholesale domestic or
cross-border funding is contained, in our opinion, and to a degree
offsets our concerns about systemwide funding. The banking system's
core customer deposits (including bonds placed with retail clients)
cover between 90% and 100% of its customer loans. Italian
banks depend on external debt to cover about 15% of total loans on a
net basis, by our estimates. But a significant portion of external debt
relates to funding that foreign banks have provided to domestic
subsidiaries, which we believe is clearly less confidence sensitive. We
also believe that Italian banks' pools of assets eligible for ECB
funding is sufficiently wide to cover 2012 wholesale maturities. In
addition, the Italian government has offered Italian banks the option
to request a state guarantee for ECB funding received in an amount up
to their regulatory capital. The Bank of Italy has also temporarily
expanded the eligibility criteria for credit claims used as collateral
in the ECB's lending operations, as part of the ECB's support measures
for banks. As for other eurozone members, our assessment of Italy's
systemwide funding incorporates our expectation that the ECB will
maintain its liquidity support for banks.
We have maintained our assessment of "intermediate risk" for Italy's
"institutional framework." Italy has gradually aligned its regulatory
standards with international best practices in recent years.
Supervision is effective and hands-on, in our opinion. Italy's banking
regulator has a good record in dealing with individual bank crises, in
our view. However, we believe that some banks, particularly small ones,
tend to have less-than-optimal governance. Still, Italy's banks still
generally have some leeway that allows them to delay recognizing credit
losses.
We classify the Italian government as "supportive" toward
its banking sector. We recognize the government's record of providing
support to the banking system in times of stress.
